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1. Introduction 
 
Growing inequality throughout the world has spurred renewed interest in wealth taxation 
as an instrument to raise revenue and reduce disparities in income and wealth. While 
levels of inequality have increased in most countries, the timing and the size of the 
increases vary by country. Countries also vary in their ability to use tax and spending 
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measures to reduce inequality. Looking at estimates of pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality 
and after-tax and after-transfer inequality, such as Gini coefficients, ratios of top deciles 
or quintiles to lower groups (such as 90/10 and 90/50 ratios), and the share of income or 
wealth held by the top 1%, confirm that levels of inequality have increased greatly over 
the last 30 years.
1
 While the primary focus has been on income inequality, in many 
countries, the levels of wealth inequality are twice as high as the levels of income 
inequality.
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Scholars have identified several factors that may contribute to increased inequality, 
including globalization, skill-biased technological change, decline in labor market 
protection, increased migration from rural to urban areas, and changing demographics 
(including the aging of populations and the rise of single person households). While one 
can list potential factors that may result in higher levels of inequality, establishing a 
causal connection between these factors and actual increases in inequality is more 
challenging. What is likely is that factors influencing changes in levels of inequality vary 
by country, and within each country, the individual determining factors have different 
consequences for different segments of the population.  
 
While scholars have extensively examined the role of income and consumption taxes in 
both developed and developing countries, less attention has been given to the role of 
wealth taxation. At the World Bank conference “Winning the Tax Wars,” Eric M. Zolt 
(Michael H. Schill Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law), Richard 
Murphy (Professor of Practice in International Political Economy, City University, 
London), and Joe Thorndike (Director of the Tax History Project at Tax Analysts and 
contributing editor for Tax Notes magazine), presented some preliminary thoughts on the 
fundamentals of wealth taxes. They discussed why wealth taxes might be desirable on 
equity and efficiency grounds, and the political and economic challenges of increasing 
use of wealth taxes. They also highlighted how recent economic, political, and 
technological changes likely increase the desirability and administrative feasibility of 
expanded use of wealth taxation. 
 
This chapter reviews the main issues addressed at the conference and seeks to provide a 
foundation to encourage further examination of the increased role of wealth taxation in 
the fiscal architecture of developing countries. 
 
Recent developments provide a strong basis for increasing the role of wealth taxes in both 
developed and developing countries. Throughout the world, greater political awareness 
exists about high levels of income and wealth inequality as well as the tax avoidance and 
evasion strategies of multinational corporations and high-wealth individuals. Recent 
OECD initiatives on automatic exchange of information, greater use of registries on 
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beneficial ownership of financial assets, greater access to bank information (resulting 
from the U.S. and other countries efforts to require banks to disclose foreign accounts), 
and the decline in bank secrecy laws should provide taxing authorities with greater ability 
to monitor the income and wealth of individuals residing in their countries. Technological 
advances have also made it easier for taxing authorities to identify and value assets, and 
emerging technologies will dramatically improve governments’ abilities to track them.  
 
For developing countries, increased use of wealth taxation provides an opportunity to 
improve the progressivity of the tax system and to raise additional revenue to fund public 
social spending programs targeted to reduce rising inequality. Wealth taxes may also 
mitigate increasing intergenerational transmission of inequality and the growing 
inequality of opportunity. This chapter seeks to highlight key issues about wealth taxation 
and to further the debate about the increased role of wealth taxes in raising revenue and 
reducing inequality. 
 
2. Why are Wealth Taxes Desirable? 
 
Several factors support higher taxes on the wealthy (including annual wealth taxes on 
specific assets), especially in times of increasing inequality. The discussion below 
highlights the common arguments that support the increased use of wealth taxes, as well 
as some of the qualifications and challenges that might apply. 
 
2.1. Equity Justifications  
 
Higher taxes on the wealthy are often justified based on the “ability to pay” principal and 
the “benefit” principle. In determining relative ability to pay, wealth taxes can play an 
important role in supplementing income taxes, especially in those countries where the 
income tax plays a relatively minor role in redistributing income. As wealth is essentially 
multi-year accumulation of income, countries could address extreme concentration of 
wealth by taxing income more progressively. For countries that do not tax income from 
capital effectively, wealth taxes (whether in the form of annual wealth taxes on specific 
assets or an estate or inheritance tax) can serve to improve the fairness of the tax system 
by increasing the tax burden on accumulated capital. In addition, because an individual’s 
tax capacity reflects both income and net wealth, using both income and wealth taxes 
may better approximate an individual’s ability to pay than just using personal income 
taxes. Equity concerns may also support wealth taxes where a disproportionate share of a 
country’s economic gains are received by the wealthy or where the wealthy have used tax 
avoidance and evasion strategies to minimize their tax liability under the personal income 
tax.  
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The benefit principle also provides support for the use of wealth taxes. The creation of 
private wealth depends on governments providing public goods and services such as 
security, protection of property rights (including intellectual property rights), 
infrastructure improvements, and education and health services to develop and support a 
qualified workforce. Murphy observes that those at the high end of the income and 
wealth distribution benefit greatly, and perhaps disproportionately, from these 
government-provided goods and services.  In many countries, there is also a strong 
perception that the wealthy have benefitted from government policies for their financial 
advantage. As Murphy notes, the wealth tax can be justified as a tax on the economic 
rents that wealth enjoys from government protection. 
 
While fairness concerns may justify higher taxes on the wealthy, Zolt emphasizes that it 
is not clear what approach countries should follow in increasing the tax burden on the 
wealthy. For some countries, introducing a new annual wealth tax on specific assets (or 
strengthening an existing wealth tax) may be the best strategy for improving the level of 
equity in the tax system. For other countries, there may be greater payoff from improving 
the taxation of income from capital under the personal income tax system or increasing 
the tax rates and effectiveness for current taxes on real estate rather than adopting an 
annual wealth tax on specific assets. 
 
2.2. Efficiency Justifications 
 
The discussants reviewed some of the possible efficiency justifications for wealth taxes. 
Some contend that wealth taxes can result in more productive use of assets by 
encouraging owners to develop under-utilized assets.  Increasing the tax costs of holding 
portfolio assets in low or no tax jurisdictions may also create incentives to invest 
resources domestically. Wealth taxes may also be less distortionary than other types of 
taxes. To the extent the burden of wealth taxes falls primarily on economic rents, the 
distortionary effects will be small. But wealth taxes also generate efficiency costs. For 
example, they create incentives to move assets out of the country and to use offshore 
entities and other opaque legal structures to disguise ownership. 
 
Discussants also highlight the difficulty of determining economic consequences of wealth 
taxes without a better understanding of who actually bears the economic burden of these 
taxes. They note that the incidence of wealth taxes likely varies by the type of wealth tax 
as well as by country-specific factors. 
 
2.3. Political Economy Benefits 
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Discussants also note the political and social economic gains that may result from 
adopting wealth taxes. Since the 19
th
 century, scholars have examined the effects of 
income inequality on a country’s prospects for democratization. In his recent book 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty highlights the dangers of excessive 
wealth concentration, including that high concentration of wealth may increase the risk of 
capture of the political system, with adverse implications for the proper functioning of a 
modern democracy.
3
  
 
Even the appearance of progressive taxation (whether in the form of progressive tax rates 
or wealth taxes) plays an important role in establishing the social legitimacy of the tax 
system. This is essential to promote social and political cohesion, and improve levels of 
tax compliance. Thorndike highlights that the success of wealth tax initiatives has relied 
on desirable social objectives: the reallocation of fiscal burdens, the fairness of the tax 
system, and the minimization of wealth concentration. These are all crucial components 
in building an enduring democracy. 
 
2.4. Administrative Gains 
 
The adoption of a wealth tax on specific assets and increasing effectiveness of existing 
taxes on real estate and improvements may also result in significant administrative gains. 
Wealth tax systems generally require taxpayers to provide a listing of certain assets and 
to value those assets. The collection of this information will be useful to tax authorities in 
administering income and consumption taxes. Disclosure of assets will allow taxing 
authorities to match reported taxable income with accumulation of assets, information 
that will prove helpful in identifying tax avoidance and evasion strategies used by 
taxpayers. Wealth taxes may also be a useful tool for anti-corruption efforts, particularly 
in those countries that require political candidates and government officials to file reports 
disclosing personal and family assets. 
 
 
3. Wealth Taxes 
 
3.1. Types of Wealth Taxes 
 
Wealth taxes come in various forms and sizes.
4
 They could cover such assets as cash and 
cash equivalents, corporate stock, corporate and government debt, privately held 
businesses, owner-occupied housing, commercial real estate, collectibles, retirement 
assets, and life insurance. A narrow view of wealth taxes would include annual taxes on 
real property and improvements, annual wealth taxes on other types of investment assets, 
and estate or inheritance taxes (including supporting taxes on lifetime transfers).  A 
6 
 
broader view of wealth taxes could include any tax on assets, including taxes on income 
from capital under the personal income tax and corporate income taxes. 
 
At a general level, three categories of wealth taxes exist: taxes imposed on the holding of 
assets; taxes imposed on the transfer of assets; and taxes imposed on the appreciation of 
assets. 
 
1. Taxes on the holding of assets include taxes on real property and other types of 
investment assets.  Countries generally assess these taxes on an annual basis, but 
in some cases, countries assess taxes as a one-time charge or on a temporary basis 
during periods of war or financial crises. 
 
2. Transfer taxes include estate or inheritance taxes on death (levied either on the 
decedents’ estate or on the beneficiary of property received) as well on certain 
lifetime gifts. Transfer taxes also include taxes related to transfers of real property 
and certain other financial assets (real estate transfer taxes, stamp taxes, and 
financial transactions taxes). 
 
3. Taxes on the appreciation of assets include capital gains taxes on realized gains 
under the personal income tax system. Some countries also treat transfers on 
death or gift as a realization event for income tax purposes.
5
 
 
Countries differ greatly in their experience with taxing wealth. Taxes on real property and 
improvements are the most common type of wealth taxes. Many countries assign these 
taxes to subnational governments. While taxes on real property raise a relatively small 
percentage of total tax revenue, they are often the largest source of local discretionary 
revenue and therefore a critical resource in the provision of local public infrastructure and 
services.  Several possible explanations exist for the relatively small revenue yield, 
including the unpopularity of property taxes, challenges in determining and collecting 
property taxes, challenges in valuing property, and the lack of political will to increase 
significantly the tax burden on real estate.
6
 Because real property and improvements 
likely represent a large percentage of wealth in many developing countries, any 
meaningful wealth tax reform would require achieving political consensus to improve the 
administration of real property tax systems and to increase the tax burden on such 
property. 
 
Murphy notes that other forms of tax on the holding of assets are rare, but he believes that 
introducing such taxes merits consideration. He also suggests that a self-assessment basis 
of valuation with penalties for under-valuation could improve compliance rates. 
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All discussants acknowledge the many challenges associated with transfer taxes in both 
developed and developing countries. While compliance rates are relatively high in many 
developed countries because of effective enforcement mechanisms, in other countries the 
levels of avoidance and evasion are sufficiently high to undermine the legitimacy of these 
taxes. Murphy notes that estate and inheritance taxes are unpopular and widely avoided, 
through transfer of assets either during the owner’s lifetime or through use of trusts and 
offshore arrangements. In many countries, transfer taxes create incentives to drive 
transactions underground or to misreport the true value of the transferred assets, 
sometimes in collusion with tax officials and public notaries. 
 
The discussants note taxes on capital gains are an important part of most tax systems, but 
the revenue yields are generally relatively low. In many tax systems, the primary role of 
capital gains taxation is not to raise revenue but to prevent leakage from the personal tax 
system. Murphy observes that in recent years many countries have reduced capital gains 
tax rates to spur investment and entrepreneurship, despite the lack of any clear evidence 
about the effectiveness of such measures.  
 
 
3.2. Role in Tax System 
 
At a general level, there are three major bases for taxation: income, consumption, and 
wealth. Zolt highlights that countries can use wealth taxes to either supplement existing 
income or consumption taxes, or to replace existing taxes. For example, countries can 
retain current taxes on income and consumption but impose an additional wealth tax 
targeted at certain assets or high-wealth individuals.  The combination of wealth taxes 
and income taxes may allow countries to use revenues from a wealth tax to reduce 
marginal tax rates under the income tax. Countries can also use wealth taxes to tax certain 
investment assets on a presumptive basis, or as a minimum tax for income tax purposes 
(for individuals and corporations). 
 
Scholars have proposed using wealth taxes to replace existing taxes.
7
 For example, 
countries could combine a progressive consumption tax with an annual wealth tax to 
replace the income tax. Countries can also de-link the taxation of income from labor and 
income from capital,
8
 and consider using wealth taxes to tax income from capital either 
on a mark-to-market taxation basis or as a retrospective tax on capital. 
 
Zolt notes that the Netherlands’ tax on portfolio income provides an interesting example 
of a wealth tax as part of the personal income tax system. In 2001, the Netherlands 
adopted a schedule approach in their personal income tax system dividing income into 
three boxes: 
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 Box 1: Taxable income from labor and homeownership taxed at progressive rates; 
Box 2: Taxable income from substantial business interest taxed at a flat rate; and 
Box 3: Taxable income from portfolio investments taxed at presumptive tax rates. 
 
The presumptive tax rate for Box 3 assumes that net assets generate a return of 4% and 
are subject to a 30% tax rate. While this is part of the personal income tax system, it is 
effectively a wealth tax on portfolio investments taxed at an annual tax rate of 1.2%. 
 
 
3.3. Design Issues in Adopting a Wealth Tax 
 
The discussants reviewed some of the major design issues in adopting an annual tax on 
assets. These include determining the scope of the tax, identification and disclosure of 
assets, valuation of assets, treatment of liabilities, and addressing liquidity concerns.  
 
The initial question is determining who is subject to the tax and what assets are included. 
For example, Zolt notes that countries could assess an annual wealth tax of specific assets 
on individuals, households, families, or entities. For many closely held businesses, 
ownership interests are spread among many different family members. It will often be 
easier to determine the valuation of the entire business than in valuing the interests held 
by a single individual. Particularly in developing countries, using the family (broadly 
defined) as the unit of taxation may make it easier to impose wealth taxes on large family 
enterprises. 
 
Discussants also reviewed the types of assets that could be subject to an annual wealth 
tax. Determining which assets are subject to a wealth tax may depend on several different 
factors, including valuation challenges, challenges in identifying assets, political 
resistance, and effectiveness in taxing high-wealth individuals. 
 
Another important issue in designing wealth taxes is the treatment of debt used to acquire 
or hold assets. Countries could impose taxes on a gross basis (for example, taxes on real 
property) or on a net basis that provides for offsets for debt incurred on the acquisition or 
holding of assets (such as some annual wealth taxes of investment assets). While 
allowing an offset for debt would be more effective in taxing the net wealth of the 
taxpayer, allowing adjustments for debt presents additional challenges in administering a 
wealth tax. Because of the fungibility of money, allowing debt adjustments will 
encourage taxpayers to allocate debt to those assets that are subject to the wealth tax, 
even if the debt is not related to those assets. 
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Finally, policy makers may need to consider some measures to address challenges related 
to liquidity for those taxpayers who have substantial assets, but lack the cash to pay the 
taxes.  While liquidity challenges most often arise with respect to estate or inheritance 
taxes imposed on the value of closely-held businesses and family farms, it is still a 
concern with respect to annual real property taxes, particularly for elderly taxpayers.    
 
 
4. Challenges in Adopting Wealth Taxes 
 
This section examines some of the challenges and risks of adopting wealth taxes. These 
include the political challenges in taxing wealth, the lack of popular support for wealth 
taxes, and administrative challenges facing developing countries. 
 
4.1 Political Challenges in Taxing Wealth 
 
Countries vary greatly in their relative use of tax instruments to fund government 
operations and in their ability to impose higher taxes on the wealthy. With some 
exceptions, the percentage of tax revenue raised by income taxes in developing countries 
is much lower than the percentage in developed countries.
9
 The variation is even greater 
if one examines the relative revenue raised by personal income taxes, especially the 
relative revenue collected under the personal income tax system on income from capital.  
 
Several possible explanations exist for the relatively low tax burden on the wealthy in 
developing countries. These include administrative challenges facing tax authorities in 
collecting taxes on income from capital (held both domestically and abroad) and the tax 
avoidance and evasion strategies used by high-net-worth individuals in avoiding tax 
liability. However, a major reason for the low levels of taxation is the lack of political 
feasibility to increase taxes on the wealthy.
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While countries continue to impose annual taxes on real property and transfer taxes on 
property (and in some countries, financial transactions), relatively few countries impose 
annual wealth taxes on specific investment assets, and several countries have abolished 
these types of taxes over the last 30 years. Similar trends exist for abolishing or reducing 
inheritance and estate taxes. Even in those countries that use wealth taxes, the tax revenue 
generated from annual wealth taxes on specific investment assets, property taxes, and 
inheritance or estate taxes are remarkably small compared to revenue generated by other 
types of taxes.  
 
 
4.2 Lack of Popular Support for Wealth Taxes 
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While few taxpayers like income and consumption taxes, wealth taxes rank at or near the 
bottom in terms of popularity, even among those who will likely never have to pay them. 
In his examination of the development of early forms of property and estate taxes in the 
United States, Thorndike outlines important political and economic factors that influence 
the rise and fall of these taxes. Box 1 sets forth Thorndike’s historical account of the U.S. 
estate tax. He finds that arguments based on the fair allocation of tax burden are more 
likely to be persuasive with voters than arguments based on redistribution. While 
increasing inequality may have played a role in the debates about wealth taxes in the 
U.S., Thorndike finds that inequality concerns are of limited importance in influencing 
tax policies.  
 
Uneasy Invention: The Politics of Wealth Taxation in the United States 
- Joseph J. Thorndike 
In the U.S., estate and inheritance taxes have been the principal instruments for taxing 
wealth for a long time. Early American experiments with wealth taxes have been 
precipitated primarily by wars and crisis. In the wake of the Quasi-war with France, a 
small estate tax, called the stamp tax - a tax proposed a few years ago - was adopted in 
1797 to fund the war. It set a graduated property tax of 0.2% on houses, land and 
slaves worth $100, up to 1% on property worth more than $30,000. But, it was plagued 
with huge administration costs. It was repealed in 1802. 
 
To help pay for the Civil War, Congress imposed a "legacy tax" in 1862. It applies to 
the transfer of property after death and imposes a gradual tax, ranging from a low of 
0.75 to a high of 5% by the degree of kinship. It was, however, considered a failure 
because it generated revenues far shorter than expected and was easy to evade. Though 
there are arguments about its successes and failures, it was repealed in 1870. There 
was a rising momentum in Congress to cut taxes culminating in the repealing of 
transfer taxes as well as legacy and succession taxes, until another war.  
 
Taxation of inherited wealth found a foothold in the law again in the wake of another 
war - the Spanish American War of 1898. Congress imposed a new gradual estate tax, 
levied on the value of all personal property in an estate. Though it is considered a 
success, it was soon repealed by law makers in 1903. The early history of wealth 
transfer taxes is a story about revenue and not reform. It was designed to address the 
particular challenge of funding wars, and was not based on a solid economic rationale. 
As a result, it did not have a stronghold in the fiscal architecture. The progressivity of 
the estate taxes aimed to ensure that wealth paid its fair share of the overall tax burden.  
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September this year marked 100 years since the modern-day estate tax was introduced 
in The Revenue Act of 1916, which also introduced the modern-day income tax. 
Revenue was still the driving force in the wake of World War I. In addition to the main 
drive to raise revenue and a fair distribution of the burden of taxation, there were 
emerging arguments by members of Congress that it also had a redistributive role. In 
1935, the estate tax was raised. Issues of concentration of wealth and the inherent 
distaste for the transmission of inequalities across generations predominated 
arguments favoring the increase in the tax. "The transmission from generation to 
generation of vast fortunes by will... is not consistent with the ideals... of the American 
people," noted Roosevelt. He also cautioned about the subsequent "perpetuation of 
great and undesirable concentration of control in a relatively few individuals." The 
later history of the estate tax in the 1990’s and 2000’s was largely dismal.  
 
Whether recent economic and political developments will change popular perception 
of the desirability of different types of wealth taxes is uncertain. As discussed below, 
in many countries, the chances for adopting wealth taxes to raise revenue and reduce 
inequality are likely higher now than in the last several decades. 
 
 
4.3 Administrative Challenges 
 
The administrative challenges of designing and implementing wealth taxes depend 
primarily on the type of wealth taxes adopted and the tax environment within specific 
countries. Murphy emphasizes that wealth taxes generally require tax authorities to locate 
the asset, to identify the owners, to value the asset, and to collect the tax. He states that 
countries that have access to high quality information of investment income, automatic 
information exchange regimes with key financial centers and offshore financial centers, 
and relatively high rates of compliance with regard to declaring investment income under 
personal tax regimes will have a much easier time collecting and enforcing wealth taxes 
than those countries that do not.  
 
An annual wealth tax on specific assets also raises identification and disclosure issues. 
Challenges exist in identifying a taxpayer’s assets, as taxpayers can physically hide assets 
(such as gold, diamonds, and fine arts), and use many techniques to obfuscate ownership 
(including the use of shell corporations, trusts, foundations, and family partnerships). 
There are also challenges in getting taxpayers to disclose ownership of assets. While 
many types of assets are subject to registration requirements (such as real property tax 
registries and financial asset registries), other types of assets are not included. As Murphy 
notes, any wealth tax system would need to provide for higher penalties for failure to 
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disclose assets, perhaps in the form of additional assessments for failure to disclose or 
higher tax rates for undisclosed assets under either capital gain taxes or inheritance taxes. 
 
Substantial challenges also exist on valuing assets.  Assets can be divided into three 
general categories: (i) those assets that are easy to value, such as publicly traded stock; 
(ii) those assets that are somewhat difficult to value, but where estimates of value would 
fall within some reasonable range (for example, most types of real estate); and (iii) those 
assets that are hard to value, including stock of closely-held corporations and complex 
financial instruments.
11
 Improvements in and the greater availability of online markets 
and online valuation platforms (such as Zillow and Redfin) provide taxing authorities 
greater ability to check estimates of taxpayers’ valuation. In those countries where the 
markets for certain assets are less robust, this may limit the type of assets that could be 
subject to wealth taxes. In all countries, taxpayers will become more aggressive in 
holding assets in different ownership structures (such as trusts, family partnerships, and 
offshore entities) that will result in increased difficulties in identifying and valuing assets. 
 
A good predictor of a country’s likely success in administering a wealth tax is the relative 
effectiveness of collecting taxes on income from capital under the personal income tax 
regime and collecting taxes on real property and improvements. Those countries with 
relatively low revenue yields and high levels of non-compliance under these taxes will 
have significant difficulties in administering many types of wealth taxes.  Additional 
challenges exist in those countries where domestic bank secrecy laws or practice limit tax 
authority’s access to taxpayer-specific financial information.  Finally, some developing 
countries may lack sufficiently robust capital and real estate markets to allow for 
effective valuation of different types of non-publicly traded property.   
  
  
5. The Changing Environment for Wealth Taxes 
 
The desirability and feasibility of increased use of wealth taxes in both developed and 
developing countries has increased significantly over the last few years. The combination 
of greater popular and political awareness of high levels of income and wealth inequality, 
with the greater exposure of the tax avoidance and evasion strategies of multinational 
corporations and high-net-worth individuals, provides a window of opportunity for 
countries to reform their tax systems to increase the tax burden on the wealthy. These 
developments provide greater support for tax reform than existed just a few years ago. 
But challenges remain in achieving the political consensus to adopt wealth taxes. In all 
countries, the wealthy are politically powerful and they have the resources and incentives 
to block increased wealth taxes. 
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Key to the successful implementation of any tax is access to information. Here again, the 
discussants noted several developments that improve the ability of taxing authorities to 
access information about the income and wealth of individuals residing in their countries 
and that increase the difficulty of wealthy individuals to hide their assets in tax haven 
countries.  The recent OECD initiatives on automatic exchange of information, greater 
use of registries on beneficial ownership of financial assets, increased disclosure by 
financial institutions of accounts held by non-residents, the decline in bank secrecy laws 
both domestically and in tax haven jurisdictions, and the greater willingness of the 
international community to challenge practices of tax haven countries in facilitating tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, all contribute to increasing a country’s ability to successfully 
implement and enforce different types of wealth taxes. Technological improvements 
provide taxing authorities greater ability to identify and value assets, and emerging tools, 
such as block chain technology, will dramatically increase the ability to track assets.  
 
Finally, several countries in the last few years have adopted tax amnesty programs under 
the personal income tax to encourage wealthy individuals to declare assets to tax 
authorities rather than face harsher tax penalties. The information acquired under these 
tax amnesty programs will provide taxing authorities a strong foundation for taxing these 
assets under either a separate wealth tax or a Netherlands-style presumptive tax on wealth 
included in the personal income tax system. 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In both developed and developing countries, the rising levels of inequality and the need 
for additional tax revenue have policy makers evaluating options for increasing the tax 
burden on the wealthy. One key component is to increase the tax burden on capital, either 
through the personal income tax system or through separate taxes on wealth. While the 
political, economic, and administrative environments vary greatly among countries, the 
desirability and the administrative feasibility of wealth taxes is much greater now than 
even just a few years ago.  
 
For Murphy, the changing global environment provides an exciting opportunity for 
developing countries to use wealth taxes to raise revenue and reduced inequality. If 
properly designed and administered, wealth taxes can raise substantial revenues that can 
serve to reduce aid dependency and to reclaim tax sovereignty. This additional source of 
revenue could fund social spending programs to reduce inequality. 
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Zolt shares Murphy’s enthusiasm for increasing the use of wealth taxes but lacks 
Murphy’s optimism. For some countries, adopting annual wealth taxes on specific assets 
and adopting or strengthening estate or inheritance taxes may be the best approach to 
reduce inequality and raise revenue. Here the revenue and political benefits from 
adopting wealth taxes exceed the political, economic, and administrative cost associated 
with these taxes. In other countries, however, there may be greater revenue gains from 
improving existing personal income taxes (especially taxes on income from capital) and 
making more effective use of taxes on real property and improvements. For example, 
several options exist for increasing the tax on capital under the personal income tax 
system. These include increasing the capital gains tax rate, increasing the tax rates on 
dividends and interest income, adopting a mark-to-market system that taxes accrued but 
not realize gains, and treating transfers by gifts and inheritance as realization events 
under the personal income tax.
12
 
 
Rather than adopt a new tax regime for taxing wealth, countries may be able to raise 
more revenue from changes to their income and property taxes.  This additional revenue 
could fund public social spending programs targeted to reduce levels of inequality.  This 
approach does not preclude countries from including “wealth-type” taxes under the 
personal income tax, either as a minimum tax or as a Netherlands-style presumptive tax 
on income from portfolio assets. 
 
For both Murphy and Zolt, what matters is not the progressivity of the tax system but the 
progressivity of all government policies, whether on the tax or expenditure side.
13
 To 
reduce inequality, government policies are needed to make the poor richer. Redistributive 
tax policies are only part of the solution. In all countries, the toughest challenge is how to 
reduce pre-tax and pre-transfer levels of inequality. Here, designing more effective and 
well-targeted spending programs on health, education, and other social services are 
necessary to reduce inequality and poverty and increase economic mobility.  
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